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Behavior is comprised of decisions made from moment to moment (i.e., to respond
one way or another). Often, the decision maker cannot be certain of the value to be
accrued from the decision (i.e., the outcome value). Decisionsmade under outcome value
uncertainty form the basis of the economic framework of decision making. Behavior is
also based on perception—perception of the external physical world and of the internal
bodily milieu, which both provide cues that guide decision making. These perceptual
signals are also often uncertain: another person’s scowling facial expression may indicate
threat or intense concentration, alternatives that require different responses from the
perceiver. Decisions made under perceptual uncertainty form the basis of the signals
framework of decision making. Traditional behavioral economic approaches to decision
making focus on the uncertainty that comes from variability in possible outcome values,
and typically ignore the influence of perceptual uncertainty. Conversely, traditional signal
detection approaches to decision making focus on the uncertainty that arises from
variability in perceptual signals and typically ignore the influence of outcome value
uncertainty. Here, we compare and contrast the economic and signals frameworks that
guide research in decision making, with the aim of promoting their integration. We show
that an integrated framework can expand our ability to understand a wider variety of
decision-making behaviors, in particular the complexly determined real-world decisions
we all make every day.
Keywords: signal detection theory, prospect theory, judgment and decision making, risk, uncertainty
Introduction
Decision making is studied from multiple perspectives, including computational modeling,
economics, epidemiology, neurobiology, and psychology. Across these disciplines, decisionmaking
is studied predominantly from two frameworks. The economic framework, formalized by utility
theory (e.g., Friedman and Savage, 1948) and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), emphasizes how people respond to variability in the value
of a decision outcome, called economic risk. The signals framework, formalized by signal
detection theory (SDT, Green and Swets, 1966), emphasizes how people respond to variability
in what something “looks like,” called perceptual uncertainty or sometimes signal-borne risk
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(Lynn et al., 2005; Lynn, 2010). In its most basic sense,
the commonality across the two frameworks is the selection
of a choice from among options. Nonetheless, the economic
and signals frameworks have remained largely isolated from
one another, likely the result of these frameworks’ orthogonal
foci on economic vs. signal-borne risk, respectively. Here, we
discuss these two decision-making frameworks with the aim of
comparing and contrasting their elements. Our goal is to provide
an integrated framework for decision making that unites the
two existing frameworks, thereby promoting the identification
of shared questions of interest, shared methodologies, relevant
results across disparate disciplines, and identification of new
avenues for research.
The integration of these frameworks is also critical because
many important real-world decisions involve both economic and
signal-borne risk, and yet research aimed at understanding such
decisions has focused almost exclusively on one type of risk
in isolation of the other. Cancer detection, for example, is a
high-stakes decision in which the influence of signal-borne risk
has received a great deal of attention. For example, Swets and
colleagues have described as a signal detection issue the process of
judging whether possible tumors imaged by mammography are
malignant (e.g., Swets, 1998; Swets et al., 2000). Cancer has also
been viewed within the economic framework where, for example,
studies have examined how patients estimate and rank their
preferences among treatment options (e.g., Saigal, 2009; for a
meta-analysis of subjective utility of treatment option in prostate
cancer, see Bremner et al., 2007). However, there is little attention
to economic risk in recognized signal detection issues, such as
cancer detection, or of signal-borne risk in recognized economic
issues, such as choosing among treatment options for a particular
cancer. Nonetheless, both types of risk are present. For example,
clinicians make biopsy recommendations based on ambiguous
signs of pathology (perceptual uncertainty or signal-borne risk)
and the outcome of a given biopsymay bemore unpredictable for
one patient than for another (outcome variability, or economic
risk). Thus, focus on one source of risk to the exclusion of the
other may miss important interactions that influence real-world
decisions.
Interactions between signal-borne and economic risk are also
likely important for understanding the more frequent decisions
that people make in their lives every day. Consider a decision
that most people make multiple times a day–choosing what
to eat. In Western countries where food is generally plentiful,
food decisions have complex subjective outcome valuations. We
presumably want food that tastes good and is also healthy. These
values can be at odds with one another, and we sometimes
feel a need to choose food that is less tasty, but more healthy.
Additionally, perceptual uncertainty plays a role in food choice.
Determining whether food is healthy can be a difficult perceptual
task. For example, Americans now frequently consume prepared
foods because of their greater convenience. The US government
requires labeling of most prepared foods with a list of ingredients
and their protein, fat, and carbohydrate content. Nonetheless,
it can be hard to discern the proportion of nutritious content
(e.g., protein, dietary fiber) relative to less nutritious content
(e.g., fat, sugar), even for the careful consumer. This perceptual
uncertainty is higher still for foods without content labels
such as at restaurants, where pictures or other food item
labels on a menu do not indicate the healthfulness of the
foods. Perceptual uncertainty also plays a role in determining
whether food is or is not spoiled, a different kind of “healthful”
food. We cannot always distinguish spoiled food by eye or by
smell, as illustrated by outbreaks of salmonella in putatively
“healthy” vegetables (e.g., spinach, lettuce, tomatoes, and basil;
CDC, 2010). An integrated framework would be well-suited to
framing research questions about these kinds of decisions and
the subjective perceptual and economic evaluations that they
entail.
In this article, we propose just such an integrated framework,
the Integrated Signals and Economic (ISE) Framework, which
provides a mathematical model for studying decisions that
involve both economic and signal-borne risk within a single
decision-making framework. However, we begin by providing
background information on the two predominant, existing
frameworks of decision making—the economic and signals
frameworks—for readers who may be unfamiliar with one
or both (see Existing Decision-making Frameworks). In these
background sections, we provide a specific real-world decision-
making example that enables us to contrast features emphasized
by each of the frameworks and thus to point out the strengths and
limitations of each. Next, in Integrating the Signals and Economic
Frameworks, we integrate the two existing frameworks into a
single, new overarching framework, including a mathematical
description. In the final section (Research Agenda Suggested by
the ISE Framework), we provide additional examples of research
questions that could be better addressed using the new integrated
framework, leveraging insights from this integrated framework to
address more complex decisions like those often made in the real
world.
Existing Decision-making Frameworks
Terminology
Before providing more detailed discussion of the economic
and signals frameworks of decision-making, we first define
terminology used by each framework, with an emphasis on
comparing and contrasting their differing terminology, and
in some cases, how they use identical terminology to mean
something different (Table 1). Showing how these terms differ
both contrasts the economic and signals frameworks and
provides an important step toward their integration by allowing
better communication and understanding among researchers
from different theoretical backgrounds.
The Economic Framework
In the economic framework (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1982), a
decision maker must choose one of two (or more) options,
commonly referred to as “prospects,” “gambles,” or “wagers.”
The options typically differ in the variability of their potential
outcome values, or payoffs. The options may have monetary
outcome values (e.g., money gained by choosing one option
or another), although the economic framework is not limited
to decisions about money. For example, the outcome values
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TABLE 1 | Comparison of terms used in the economic and signals
frameworks.
Term Economic framework Signals framework
Risk Variability in costs or benefits.
In some uses, that variability
must be known to the
decision makera
Likelihood of accruing a cost
Uncertainty Outcomes that occur with a
probability less than 1. In
some uses, variability in a
payoff that is unknown to the
decision makera
The same signal value can be
an exemplar of both the target
and foil categories
Outcome The event that follows making
a decision (e.g., the number
rolled on a die), or the event’s
payoff
A correct detection, missed
detection, false alarm, or
correct rejection event; this is
independent from its
associated payoff
Value The payoff (benefit or cost)
accrued from a decision
The physical measurement of
a signal, or the payoff (benefit
or cost) accrued from a
decision
Base rate The probability associated
with a specific outcome or
payoff
The relative encounter rate
with the target vs. foil
categories
a In the economic framework, uncertainty is often used to mean that an outcome value
occurs with some probability less than 1 (i.e., it is not necessarily certain to happen).
However, uncertainty has also been used to refer to ambiguity of the probabilities
associated with an option’s various possible outcome values (i.e., uncertainty about
the probabilities themselves; Knight, 1921; Chua Chow and Sarin, 2002; Volz and
Gigerenzer, 2012; see also Bland and Schaefer, 2012). Thus, some researchers utilize
a stricter meaning for uncertainty, meaning unknown (to the decision maker) outcome
value variability. If the variability is known by the decision maker the outcome is risky; if it
is unknown the outcome is uncertain. Here, we do not distinguish known from unknown
variability. Because it separately parameterizes all payoff and probability elements, the ISE
Framework offers the potential to flexibly model the effect of known vs. unknown variability
on decision making.
could be lives saved by choosing to administer a vaccine or
not. Consider a typical monetary decision-making example: A
decision maker is asked to choose between $50 for certain
(Option A) or a 50% chance of getting either $25 or $75 (Option
B). In this example, Option A has no outcome value variability;
selecting Option A will always result in the same payoff.
Option B, however, has outcome value variability, although on
average, it has the same $50 expected payoff as Option A.
Thus, the economic framework focuses on variability in the
costs and benefits accrued as a result of a decision. Within
the economic framework, decisions typically do not involve
perceptual uncertainty about the options–for example different
options are perceptually distinct and clearly defined. Major
emphases of research within the economic framework include
the effects of outcome value variation on choice (e.g., Verplanken
and Holland, 2002; Mcclure et al., 2004), the effect of context or
framing on sensitivity to outcome value variation (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Kühberger, 1998; Windmann et al., 2006),
and the neuroanatomical and functional correlates of economic
decision making (e.g., Knutson et al., 2005; Kable and Glimcher,
2007).
An Example
Imagine that you have the option to ride a bicycle to work or drive
a car. Let us assume that you prefer to drive if it will be a rainy day,
but you prefer to bike if it will be a sunny day and that getting
caught on your bicycle in heavy rain is worse than getting caught
in light rain.Where you live, there is a 50% chance that it will rain
on any given day. On half of the days when it rains, it is a light
rain. On half of the days when it rains, it is a heavy rain. Every
work day, you make a decision, choosing either to commute by
car or by bicycle.
This example has features typical of a decision posed within
the economic framework. Namely, there are two options to
choose from, “Bike” or “Drive.” Each option results in an
outcome that occurs with some probability, and has an associated
value that will accrue. Let us represent the value of the options
as points, as a proxy for something like “enjoyment,” and say
that if you choose to bike, there is a 50% chance of a 100 point
gain (it is a sunny day), a 25% chance of a 10 point loss (a light
rain) and a 25% chance of a 90 point loss (a heavy rain). If you
choose to drive, there is a 50% chance of a 100 point gain (it is
a rainy day) and a 50% chance of a 50 point loss (it is a sunny
day).
According to expected value theory, a widely used formalism
within the economic framework (Friedman and Savage, 1948;
Keeney and Raiffa, 1976), the value a decision maker can expect
to accrue for choosing a particular option, EV(Option), is given
by the sum of the values (vi) of each of its possible outcomes
(for i = 1 to n) weighted by the probability (pi) with which that
outcome will occur:
EV(Option) = p1v1 + p2v2 + . . . + pnvn (1)
An option, then, results in any one of several possible outcomes of
different value and probability. Some outcomes will have positive
values (benefits) and some have negative values (costs). The
expected value of an option is the average value accrued over a
series of choices of that option. The probabilities of outcomes 1
to n must sum to 1. In expected value theory, a decision maker
should choose the option with the highest expected value. If the
expected values among options are equal (as they are here), then
a preference for risk proneness or risk aversion can dictate choice
(biking or driving, respectively).
In the current example, the expected value of the options
is equal, but one option has greater variability in its outcome
values than the other. EV(bike) = (0.5 × 100 points) + (0.25
×−10 points) + (0.25 ×−90 points) = 25 points. EV(drive) =
(0.5 ×−100 points) + (0.5 × 0.5 × 100 points) + (0.5 × 0.5 ×
100 points) = 25 points. In this example, both options involve
economic risk: the value accrued by choosing either option could
be beneficial or costly, depending on the weather. However, the
costs of biking might be high or low, depending on how hard
it rains. Thus, the option to bike has additional risk of potential
losses that the drive option does not have (Figure 1).
Psychological Influences on Parameter Estimates
Within the economic framework, utility theory and prospect
theory represent modifications of expected value theory that
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FIGURE 1 | Expected value (circles) and minimum and maximum
possible payoffs (error bars) for a hypothetical choice to bike or drive
to work.
incorporate psychological influences on decision making. Utility
theory (e.g., Friedman and Savage, 1948) arose as a revision
of expected value theory when considerable empirical evidence
accrued that failed to fit the predictions of expected value
theory. In particular, researchers observed that objective outcome
values do not have a strongly linear relationship with subjective
outcome values–a given amount of money is not worth the same
thing to different people or to the same person in different
contexts. This non-linearity resulted in poor prediction of choice
behavior using expected value theory. In utility theory, objective
outcome values (typically monetary values) are transformed into
subjective values (utilities) according to a utility function, u(vi).
The expected value of an option in utility theory is given by:
Û
(
Option
)
= p1u (v1) + p2u (v2) + . . . + pnu (vn) (2)
The typical empirically-derived shape of u(vi) captures the fact
that subjective value changes rapidly at low objective values and
does not change as rapidly as objective value increases (Figure 2).
Despite the advancements of utility theory over expected
value theory in dealing with psychological influences on decision
making, researchers continued to observe human behavior that
failed to adhere even to the predictions of utility theory. To
address these shortcomings, prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) improved upon
estimates of subjective value and addressed people’s seemingly
irrational use of base rates (the relative probabilities of alternative
outcomes in a decision). Prospect theory shares features with
utility theory. Both utilize a subjective value function, but in
prospect theory the shape of this function is altered, and termed
a “value function” instead of a “utility function.” Unlike a utility
function, the value function, V(vi) is defined not by absolute
subjective values, but by deviations from a specific reference
point (typically one’s current assets). The value function is
generally convex for gains and concave for losses, and steeper
for losses than for gains (Figure 3). In addition, prospect
FIGURE 2 | A hypothetical utility function. Utility changes as a convex
function of absolute objective value.
theory proposes that probabilities (typically given explicitly for
each option) are transformed into subjective decision weights
(analogous to how objective outcome values are transformed
into subjective outcome values) using a probability-weighting
function, d(pi). The probability-weighting function is meant
to account for individuals’ so-called “irrational” treatment of
extreme probabilities. For example, the probability-weighting
function defines decision weights that are greater than the stated
objective probabilities when those stated probabilities are very
low. Likewise, the function defines decision weights less than the
stated probabilities when those probabilities are very high. The
expected value of an option in prospect theory is:
P
(
Option
)
= V(v1) d
(
p1
)
+ V(v2) d
(
p2
)
+ . . . (3)
+V(vn) d
(
pn
)
The types of decisions posed within the economic framework
can be quite similar to problems faced by decision makers
outside the laboratory, e.g., maximizing returns on investments,
tradeoffs made when buying different car models. Nonetheless,
experimental tests of how these decisions are made typically do
not implement perceptual uncertainty, which is the major focus
of the signals framework. For example, investment decisions
posed in written vignettes delineate explicit and distinctive
options, which may have more or less variable payoffs (e.g., in
terms of money earned, lives saved). Similarly, in a card-playing
task, visibly distinct card decks ensure that a decision maker
will draw a card from one or the other of the decks displayed.
Although the decisionmaker may be uncertain about the value of
the card to be drawn, there is no uncertainty about whether the
card is from one deck vs. the other. Researchers solely utilizing
the economic framework to understand decision making will
neglect how perceptual uncertainty can affect decision processes.
The Signals Framework
In the signals framework (Green and Swets, 1966; Lynn and
Barrett, 2014), a perceiver classifies a percept as one of two
possible options. In a detection decision, the perceiver decides
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FIGURE 3 | A hypothetical value function from prospect theory. The
value function is generally convex for gains and concave for losses, and
steeper for losses than for gains. From Kahneman and Tversky (1979), with
permission from the Econometric Society.
if the percept was present (i.e., the “signal” option) or absent
(i.e., the “noise” option). For example, a perceiver might be
asked to determine whether a tone is present or not on each
trial of an auditory task in which some trials contain non-tone
white noise and other trials contain a tone of variable acoustic
intensity embedded in white noise. In an identification decision,
the perceiver decides if the percept (a “signal”) is an exemplar
of one category (Option A) or another (Option B). For example,
on each trial of an emotion perception task, a perceiver might
be asked to determine whether an ambiguous facial expression
communicates a state of happiness or anger. In both detection
and identification paradigms, the two options span different but
overlapping ranges of a single, continuous, perceptual dimension,
such as decibels of acoustic energy or expressive facial features1
(Figure 4). Thus, the signals framework focuses on variability
in the perceptual features of the options (e.g., how similar in
appearance exemplars from Option A are to those of Option B).
We will frame our discussion of the signals framework in terms
of identification paradigms, and not further distinguish between
detection and identification here [but see Green and Swets (1966)
and Macmillan and Creelman (2005), for more details on this
distinction].
Within the signals framework, decisions typically impose no
variation in the payoffs accrued from the possible outcomes2
1On the surface, choosing one of two (or more) options presented to a decision
maker simultaneously might seem like a very different process than categorizing
each of a series of individual signals presented one at a time. Nonetheless,
categorizing a signal is a choice between one of two options: a perceiver
decides to categorize the signal as Option A or Option B, and this decision
is followed by an outcome. Moreover, SDT has a well-developed mathematical
treatment of “simultaneous” presentation of two options, known as two-alternative
forced-choice (2AFC; or more generally, nAFC, Macmillan and Creelman,
2005). Although we will continue to frame our discussion of SDT in terms of
identification paradigms where stimuli are presented one at a time, the integration
of the two frameworks readily translates to other SDT paradigms, including
detection and nAFC.
2Perceivers do encounter variability in the outcome value they experience from
responding to a particular signal value: when a signal (e.g., 40% scowling, in
Figure 4) is an example of a target, choosing the “target” option will accrue a
(e.g., in terms of money or points earned). In fact in many
experiments, the outcomes of a decision (correct detections, false
alarms, missed detections, and correct rejections; see Figure 1)
are not typically assigned specific values, beyond simple feedback
to indicate that the decision was correct or incorrect. When
payoffs are made more specific (e.g., See et al., 1997; Lynn
et al., 2012), they do not usually have probabilistic variation
in the way that is modeled by the economic framework (e.g.,
the payoff of a correct detection does not vary from trial-to-
trial). Major emphases of research within the signals framework
include the factors that affect bias (weighting of costs, benefits,
and probability estimates; e.g., See et al., 1997; Bohil and
Maddox, 2001) and sensitivity (ability to discriminate the two
options; e.g., Grinband et al., 2006; Aberg and Herzog, 2012),
the neuroanatomical correlates of perceptual learning (e.g., Gold
et al., 2004; Sasaki et al., 2010), and evolutionary consequences
of decisions made under perceptual uncertainty (e.g., Lynn et al.,
2005; Wiley, 2006).
An Example
Let us return to the example first outlined in An Example in
The Economic Framework concerning the decision to bike or
drive to work. From the signals framework there is additional
information available, beyond the expected value and economic
risk, to help a perceiver decide which option to choose. That
additional information is what the weather looks like3. Let us
imagine that you assess the likely weather by looking out the
window each morning. If it looks like it will rain, you decide
to drive. If it looks like it will not rain, you decide to bike.
At this point, our example becomes a signal detection issue, in
addition to being an economic decision. You evaluate a signal, the
weather. Deciding to drive on a rainy day (a correct detection),
and deciding to ride on a non-rainy day (a correct rejection),
both accrue benefits. Deciding to drive on a non-rainy day (a false
correct detection payoff (e.g., “That was correct.” feedback); when the signal is
instead a foil, choosing the “target” option will accrue a false alarm payoff (e.g.,
“That was not correct.” feedback). This source of outcome value variability might
be termed “selection risk” and is the recognized source of response bias in the
signals framework. However, in contrast to the economic framework, selection
risk is not intrinsic to the option itself (i.e., the targets do not vary in the benefit
accrued to the perceiver for correctly responding “target”). Targets and foils do
have two values associated with them (i.e., for targets, a benefit of correct detection
and a cost of missed detection). However, in contrast to the economic framework,
those values accrue only as a result of two different decisions (choose “target” vs.
choose “foil,” respectively). They do not represent two different outcome values
for the same choice, i.e., outcome values that are intrinsic to the target or foil
category. Economic risk that is intrinsic to the target or foil category might be
termed “category risk”: variability in a particular payoff (i.e., h, j, a or m; see
Equation 4), inherent to the target or foil categories. Category risk is not typically
manipulated within the signals framework. In the economic framework, selection
risk and category risk are inseparable due to the lack of perceptual uncertainty (see
Adding Perceptual Uncertainty to the Economic Framework).
3A component of our example that is relatively novel to the signals framework
is that the signals here (what the weather looks like) are not emitted by the
options themselves (biking and driving). Outside the laboratory, the perceptual
domain on which decisions may be based can be separate from the options under
consideration. Similarly, the perceptual cue can influence costs and benefits of
options (i.e., getting rained on is a cost, directly associated with the perceptual cue
of the current weather), whereas other costs and benefits are not related to the
cue (e.g., benefit of exercise, cost of gas). Rather, they are inherent to the options,
regardless of signal value.
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FIGURE 4 | Elements of the signals framework (after Lynn and
Barrett, 2014). In emotion perception, for example, facial expressions are
evaluated by one person (the perceiver) to determine the emotional state of
another person (the sender). Signals, depicted on the x-axis, comprise two
categories: targets (defining, e.g., what the sender looks like when she is
angry) and foils (defining, e.g., what the sender looks like when she is not
angry). Signals from either category vary over a perceptual domain such as
“scowl intensity.” Any signal (i.e., a particular scowl intensity) can arise from
either category, with a likelihood given by the target and foil distributions.
Perceivers therefore, experience uncertainty about the category membership
of any particular signal. Here, the perceiver responds to facial expressions to
the right of criterion (red arrow) as if they were angry, and to facial
expressions to the left of criterion as if they were not angry. Perceivers make
a decision between two options and the perceptual uncertainty yields four
possible outcomes: (1) Classifying a stimulus as a target when it is a target is
a correct detection. (2) Classifying a stimulus as a target when it is a foil is a
false alarm. (3) Classifying a stimulus as a foil when it is a target is a missed
detection. (4) Classifying a stimulus as a foil when it is a foil is a correct
rejection. Measures of sensitivity (e.g., d’) characterize perceptual
uncertainty, depicted here as overlap of the target and foil distributions.
Measures of bias (e.g., c or beta) characterize the decision criterion’s location
in the perceptual domain. Sensitivity and bias are derived from the numbers
of correct detections and false alarms committed over a series of decisions
(Macmillan and Creelman, 2005). Perceptual uncertainty causes the
perceiver to make mistakes regardless of his or her degree of bias; missed
detections cannot be reduced without increasing false alarms.
alarm), and deciding to ride on a rainy day (a missed detection),
both accrue costs.
In signal detection theory, the mathematical formalization of
the signals framework, a perceiver makes subjective “estimates”
of three parameters, though not necessarily consciously. The first
parameter is the similarity of the signal distributions. Any signal
comes from one of two distributions. Here, the distributions are
“what the weather looks like when it will rain” (we will call this
the category of targets), and “what the weather looks like when
it will not rain” (so-called foils). Some days it is hard to tell–
the sky looks the same regardless of whether it proves to be
a rainy commute or not, creating perceptual uncertainty. The
second parameter is the probability with which the perceiver
encounters targets (rainy days) vs. foils (non-rainy days), called
base rate. Here, we have stipulated that there is a 50% chance
that it will rain on any given day. The third parameter is the
payoffs associated with correct and incorrect decision outcomes.
Translating the point values from above: a correct detection
accrues the 100 point gain associated with driving on a rainy
day, a missed detection accrues the 50 point loss associated
with driving on a sunny day, a correct rejection accrues the
100 point gain associated with biking on a sunny day, and a
false alarm accrues the average 50 point loss associated with
biking on a rainy day. For now, we ignore the variation in
false alarm cost due to light vs. heavy rain because application
of the signals framework does not typically consider economic
risk.
In signal detection theory, the perceiver is conceived of as
placing a threshold, or decision-criterion, on the signal domain
(what the weather looks like). The SDT expected value function
(Swets et al., 1961) can be used to calculate the expected value of
placing a criterion at any possible location on the signal domain,
for a given set of parameter values:
EV (xi) = αhp[CD] + αmp[MD] + (1 − α)ap[FA] (4)
+ (1− α)jp[CR]
Where:
EV(xi), expected value of a decision criterion at signal value
xi;
α, alpha, the base rate or relative probability of encountering
a signal from the target distribution; 1−α equals the relative
probability of encountering a signal from the foil distribution;
h, benefit of correct detection;
m, cost of missed detection;
a, cost of false alarm; and
j, benefit of correct rejection. Costs might be negative or
simply less positive than benefits, as long as h > m and j > a.
p[CD], probability of correct detection, measured as the
integral of the target distribution over x from criterion to infinity;
p[MD], probability of missed detection, equal to 1− p[CD];
p[FA], probability of false alarm, measured as the integral of
the foil distribution over x from criterion to infinity;
p[CR], probability of correct rejection, equal to 1− p[FA].
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The criterion location with the highest expected value is
the optimal criterion location on average (i.e., over a series of
decisions); the perceiver should drive if the weather looks worse
than the optimal criterion value. Given the stipulated equivalent
base rate of encountering targets vs. foils and the balanced
payoff matrix in our example, the signals framework specifies
a neutral bias (Figure 5). A perceiver maximizing expected
value should show no tendency to select one option over the
other.
Integrating the Signals and Economic
Frameworks
If viewed solely within each of the separate decision-making
frameworks, the above decision-making example (choosing to
drive or bike to work; see An Example in The Economic
Framework and An Example in The Signals Framework)
reveals limitations that arise from these frameworks’ orthogonal
emphases on economic vs. signal-borne risk. Each framework
highlights certain features of the decision. Using only one
framework neglects decision features important to the other (see
also Summerfield and Tsetsos, 2012, for additional perspective).
Further, when both sources of variability are important for
the decision maker, studying the features from only one of
the frameworks impedes understanding of how these features
interact functionally for the decision maker.
In this section, we (1) describe how perceptual uncertainty
from the signals framework can be integrated into models of
economic risk as an initial step toward combining these two
frameworks, (2) demonstrate that consideration of economic
risk in the signals framework leads to novel hypotheses and
predictions for decision making, and (3) introduce a combined
decision-making model, the Integrated Signals and Economic
(ISE) Framework.
Adding Perceptual Uncertainty to the Economic
Framework
We can consider the emphasis on outcome value in the economic
framework as modeling a special case of decisions—those in
which there is no perceptual uncertainty. Imagine the following
decision between two options: one option with a 50% chance
of paying $35 and a 50% chance of paying $55, the other
with a 100% chance of $45. To make the parallels between
the economic and signals frameworks explicit, let us consider
the first option the Target option and the second option the
Foil option. This example can be viewed as a special case of a
signal detection problem in which the target and foil options
are so distinct that there is no perceptual uncertainty: the
options (Target or Foil) cannot be perceptually mistaken for
one another. If we consider these two options as equivalent to
a choice between two options in the signals framework, then
we recognize that the individual payoff parameters in the SDT
expected value function are themselves expected value functions
from the economic framework: EV(target) = h = $45 and
EV(foil)= j= $45.
In the SDT expected value function, the Target and Foil
options are both included in a single equation, weighted by
their relative base rates of occurrence. Because, in the economic
framework, the options are presented simultaneously, we take
the base rates for both options to be equivalent for this example
(i.e., α = 0.5). Furthermore, with no uncertainty, for the Target
distribution, p[CD] ∼ 1 and p[MD] ∼ 0, while for the Foil
distribution, p[CR] ∼ 1 and p[FA] ∼ 0. In signals framework
terms, then:
EV (xi) = αh + (1− α)j (5)
Expressed as a signal detection issue, the expected value function
for a decision in the economic framework reduces to a constant
over all perceptual signal values, x, which is the average of the
FIGURE 5 | The influence of perceptual uncertainty about the
weather in a hypothetical decision about whether to bike or drive
to work. This illustration implements benefits and costs relevant to
getting caught in the rain on a bicycle or not. Mean target = 60%
chance of rain, mean foil = 40% chance of rain, with standard
deviations = 15% chance of rain; base rate = 0.5; h = 100 points,
m = −50 points, a = −50 points, j = 100 points. Given these parameter
values, the optimal criterion location (drop line) indicates that a perceiver
should drive to work when the chance of rain is 50% or greater. The
y-axis for the distributions (probability density) is not shown.
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expected values of the options (Figure 6A). Moreover, because
there are only two perceptually distinct values of x (one for each
option), what is generally a continuous function across all values
of x in SDT is reduced here to two discrete points.
As perceptual uncertainty (i.e., variance in the “appearance”
of the options) increases, a recognizable signal detection
issue emerges (Figures 6B,C). The probability of making false
alarm and missed detection mistakes becomes greater than
zero and their associated costs can influence behavior, as
modeled by Equation (4). When perceptual cues indicating
particular options are encountered one at a time, we now
have a conventional problem as posed within the signals
framework.
Within the economic framework, the idea of decision cues is
relevant to perceptual uncertainty. A cue is similar to a channel
of information (e.g., Payne et al., 1992; Newell et al., 2004).
For example, in Figure 4, a facial expression is a useful cue of
emotional state, and a person making an emotion judgment
about someone would do well to attend to that cue (i.e., to
base their decisions on signals, such as scowl intensity, in that
FIGURE 6 | Expected value over x for target and foil options (A) with no
perceptual uncertainty, (B) with little perceptual uncertainty, and (C)
with more perceptual uncertainty. Sigma refers to the standard deviations
of both signal distributions.
channel). However, research on cues is largely focused on cue
validity and cue selection. Here, we are introducing variability
of cue-values among options with the aim of modeling how that
variability may influence decision making. Whereas research on
cues is oriented toward how decisionmakers select a channel, our
application of perceptual uncertainty to the economic framework
is oriented toward how decisionmakers utilize signals within that
channel.
In this section, we demonstrated that decisions studied
within the economic framework can be modeled within the
signals framework if one allows that many of the SDT expected
value function’s variables reduce to constants in the absence
of perceptual uncertainty. Lacking signal distributions, these
decisions reduce to a choice between the expected values of two
discrete options. Despite this consideration, however, it is not
accurate to claim that the signals framework captures all of the
insights from both frameworks merely because it addresses a
broader category of decisions. Namely, the signals framework
still does not address the psychological or subjective weighting
of expected value to the extent that it has been examined
within the economics framework (see Psychological Influences
on Parameter Estimates).
Adding Economic Risk to the Signals Framework
While both the economic and signals frameworks have a
formalization of expected value that guides decision making
(Equations 1 and 4), the concept of expected value has
seen additional development within the economic framework
(Equations 2 and 3) that has seldom been applied within the
signals framework (exceptions are Barkan et al., 1998 and
Kaivanto, 2014). In this section, we model the influence of
economic risk within the signals framework to highlight how
their integration can lead to novel hypotheses and predictions
about real-world decision making behavior.
Let us return to our example of choosing whether to bike
or drive to work (described in An Example in The Economic
Framework and An Example in The Signals Framework). The
variation in false alarm cost (i.e., the cost of mistakenly choosing
to bike when it rains) represents the source of economic risk in
the example, and sets the minimum (heavy rain) and maximum
(light rain) expected value bounds. We can thus model variation
in outcome value (i.e., economic risk) in signal detection theory
as an expected-value envelope, bounded by minimum and
maximum SDT expected value functions. Figure 7 illustrates
an expected-value envelope for this example, bounded by the
minimum (heavy rain) and maximum (light rain) expected value
functions.
Novel predictions become apparent when the economic and
signals frameworks are considered together in this way. For
example, one might expect that equal variability about the
mean false alarm cost would produce equal variability about
the mean criterion location. Instead, however, this analysis
reveals that the optimal criterion of the mean expected value
function is not the mean of the light- and heavy-rain optimal
criteria. In this example, the magnitude of the effect on
behavior of a 40 point deviation from the −50-point mean
false alarm cost is not the same if that 40 points reflects
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FIGURE 7 | Combined effects of perceptual uncertainty and
economic variability on optimal criterion placement for the bike
vs. drive example. Variation in the false alarm cost (biking in heavy
vs. light rain) generates a minimum expected value function (Bike,
heavy rain) and maximum expected value function (Bike, light rain),
with corresponding conservative and liberal criterion locations, relative
to the average expected value (Mean bike, and drive). The mean
expected value function and bell shaped regions are the same as that
shown in Figure 5. Drop lines indicate optimal criterion locations for
each of the three functions.
a relatively large loss (i.e., −90 points for a false alarm in
heavy rain) as when it reflects a relative small loss (i.e.,
−10 points for a false alarm in light rain). This observation
parallels empirical findings from the economic framework,
in which “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979)–the effect, on subsequent behavior, of accruing
a cost is larger than the effect of accruing a benefit of equal
magnitude. Our example indicates that, outside the laboratory,
one contributor to such a loss bias could be perceptual
uncertainty. That is, symmetric payoff variation can produce
asymmetric effects on behavior in the presence of perceptual
uncertainty, a phenomenon that only becomes apparent when
considering interactions between economic and signal-borne
risk.
In addition, Figure 7 reveals that variability in expected
value is higher on the left (sunny) side of the signal domain
than on the right (rainy) side for our example. We might
then expect risk-averse perceivers to set a more conservative
(right-sided) criterion than risk-prone perceivers because a
conservative threshold would decrease exposure to variable
outcome values. That is, risk-prone perceivers would be more
biased toward biking while risk-averse perceivers would be
more biased toward driving. Our example indicates that, while
economic risk sensitivity is not typically accounted for within
the signals framework, it could nonetheless influence individual
differences in criterion placement. Thus, considering interactions
between economic and signal-borne risk in this way may help
explain findings within the signals framework where perceivers’
decision criteria have failed to meet the objective parameters
of the task. That is, perceivers bring their own idiosyncratic
expectations to signal detection tasks, which result in observed
response biases in the absence of objectively biasing payoffs
or base rates (Green and Swets, 1966). Moreover, in signal
detection tasks that do manipulate payoffs, humans do not
easily adapt their decision criterion to the objective payoff
values (Dusoir, 1975; Bohil and Maddox, 2001; Lynn et al.,
2012). Individual differences in economic risk sensitivity could
be one underlying explanation for the variation in criterion
location seen across perceivers within a given signal detection
study.
The Integrated Signals and Economic Framework
Our position is that decisions in the context of a decision maker’s
daily life experiences commonly involve both signal-borne risk
and economic risk. Here, we incorporate both of these types
of risk into a single decision-making framework: the Integrated
Signals and Economic (ISE) Framework. The ISE Framework
will allow researchers to explore types of risk and uncertainty
that the individual frameworks typically do not focus on. What
is missing in typical approaches to decision making using the
economic framework is an account of signal-borne risk. The
potential outcomes associated with different options (e.g., to bike
or to drive) are often cued by signals. The signals themselves are
variable, and that variation can be independent of variation in the
expected value (economic risk) of the decision outcome. What
is missing in typical approaches to decision making using the
signals framework is the idea of economic risk. Outcome values
can be variable, and are themselves value functions, impacted by
all the psychological factors that are the subject of contemporary
research in judgment and decision making. The ISE Framework
will allow for an exploration of the influence of economic
risk where its role has largely been overlooked (in perceptually
uncertain decisions) as well as an exploration of the influence of
signal-borne risk where its role has largely been overlooked (in
economically risky decisions).
A first approximation to integrating the signals and economic
frameworks mathematically is to combine the subjective value
function from prospect theory with the signals framework’s
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expected value function:
Û (xi) = αV
(
h
)
p[CD] + αV(m) p[MD]+ (1 − α) (6)
V(a) p[FA] + (1− α)V
(
j
)
p[CR]
Here, V(h, etc.), a prospect-theory treatment of the payoff
associated with each type of decision outcome, and other
variables are as defined for Equation (4).
As a second step to integrating the frameworks, we can
incorporate lessons learned from the development of prospect
theory about the importance of subjective weighting functions
for those parameters representing probabilities associated with
perceptual uncertainty:
Û (xi) = B(α)V
(
h
)
S
(
p[CD]
)
+ B(α)V(m) (7)
S
(
p[MD]
)
+ B(1− α)V(a) S
(
p[FA]
)
+ B(1− α)
V
(
j
)
S
(
p[CR]
)
where:
B(α), a decision weight of the type applied to probability
estimates in prospect theory, here applied to the relative base rate
of encountering targets vs. foils.
S(p[CD], etc.), a decision weight of the type applied to
probability estimates in prospect theory, here applied as an
estimate of the target and foil signal distributions.
Other variables are as defined for Equation (4).
The ISE Framework generates subjective utilities of possible
decision criterion locations over a continuous perceptual
domain. These utilities are weighted expected values (from
the SDT expected-value function). The weighting is done by
functions intended to model the influence of psychological
factors, such as risk sensitivity, that alter the objective values of
the three environmental parameters (perceptual similarity, base
rate, and payoffs; Figure 1). In this way, the ISE Framework
attempts to do for SDT what prospect theory did for expected
value theory and utility theory. The ISE Framework extends prior
efforts to combine the two frameworks (e.g., Barkan et al., 1998;
Kaivanto, 2014), which have not used the SDT expected-value
function to derive criteria locations directly from underlying
environmental parameters. For example, research within the
economic framework documents that people over-estimate the
occurrence of low probability events and under-estimate the
occurrence of high probability events. Prior theoretical work
modeled this effect on the SDT base rate parameter (Kaivanto,
2014). However, such probability mis-estimation presumably
influences people’s representation of the perceptual similarity
parameter as well. The ISE Framework captures this feature.
Variability in the decision environment can be characterized
at different levels of organization, e.g., the perceptual uncertainty
(signal-borne risk) and outcome variability (economic risk)
emphasized here, in addition to the variability in cue validity
across channels described above. The functional consequences
of simultaneous variability at different levels of description (e.g.,
for behavior, neural implementation, and cognitive impairments)
are unknown. Our integration of the signals and economic
frameworks can be viewed as an attempt to integrate variability
of outcome values and variability of perceptual signals within a
cue/channel.
An interesting question for future research is whether different
sources of variability are dissociated at the neural level or
whether they merely represent the same process described from
distinct methodological points of view. Because the development
of theoretical and computational models of decision making
has proceeded largely independently within the signals and
economic frameworks, so too has research examining the
neural bases of decision making. Research inspired by both
frameworks involves the search for a common final pathway
where decision-relevant information is integrated and options
are compared in some nonspecific “neural currency,” however,
the two frameworks have largely focused their empirical efforts
on the contributions of distinct brain regions (for a review
see Summerfield and Tsetsos, 2012). Given its emphasis on
distinguishing or detecting perceptual stimuli, research within
the signals framework has largely focused on areas like the
parietal cortex, which process dorsal stream input from primary
visual areas (e.g., Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Roitman and
Shadlen, 2002; Xu and Chun, 2006; Gold and Shadlen, 2007;
Gottlieb and Balan, 2010). Conversely, research guided by the
economic framework, with its emphasis on outcome valuation,
has focused on subcortical regions involved in processing reward
salience and sensitivity, largely through dopaminergic pathways
(e.g., the striatum; Schultz et al., 1997; Lauwereyns et al., 2002;
O’doherty et al., 2003; Nakamura and Hikosaka, 2006; Ding
and Hikosaka, 2007), as well as frontal regions that receive
inputs from these areas (e.g., the orbitofrontal cortex; O’doherty
et al., 2001; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Plassmann et al.,
2007; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2008; Kable and Glimcher,
2009; Kennerley et al., 2009). Interestingly, however, emerging
evidence suggests that regions commonly studied from the
signals framework as being important for integrating sensory
information are also involved in encoding information about
outcome values (e.g., the parietal cortex; Platt and Glimcher,
1999; Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Sugrue et al., 2004, 2005;
Rorie et al., 2010). Similarly, current research indicates that brain
regions commonly studied from the economic framework as
important for value-guided decision making are also critical to
making accurate perceptual category judgments (e.g., striatum;
Packard et al., 1989; Eacott and Gaffan, 1991; Ashby et al., 2003).
These findings highlight the need for a more general framework
that can assimilate neurobiological evidence from the two distinct
approaches. The ISE Framework can guide future research into
the neural bases of decision making by helping researchers pose
and test specific hypotheses concerning the independence of
economic and signal-borne risk at the biological level.
Empirical work also will be needed to determine the shape
of the new functions for the subjective weighting of base rates
and signal distributions. For example, within the economic
framework, changes in outcome probability are associated with
more pronounced differences in decision behavior when the
change in probability occurs at more extreme probabilities (e.g.,
changing the probability of occurrence of a payoff from 0 to
1% impacts decision behavior much more dramatically than
changing the probability from 50 to 51%). Likewise, it will be
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important to develop and utilize subjective weighting functions
for the parameters in the perceptual or signals component of the
ISE Framework.
Research Agenda Suggested by the ISE
Framework
A new research agenda for understanding decision making can
emerge whereby we can model perceptual uncertainty, economic
risk, and psychological influences within a single integrated
framework. The new agenda promises to broaden theoretical and
empirical work in decisionmaking tomore complex, and realistic
decision-making circumstances.
Modeling Contextual Influences on Decision
Making
One potential scientific impact of the ISE Framework is that it
permits modeling of contextual influences on decision making.
Decisions occur within the larger context of a decision maker’s
daily life, current internal or bodily states, and past experience.
The ISE Framework explicitly acknowledges that context is
an important determinant of decision behavior in vivo that
impacts perceivers’ estimates of event likelihood and value (for
review see Doya, 2008). Context can be broadly interpreted,
and encompasses both factors external to the decision maker,
such as how decision options are framed, and factors internal
to the decision maker, such as the person’s internal states and
their behavioral tendencies or individual differences that can
influence decisions in the moment. The more explicit modeling
of decision-making parameters provided by the ISE Framework
would expand such research by providing an approach for
systematically exploring the causal mechanisms driving the
influence of context on decision making.
Within the economic framework, research into the effects
of context on decision making has focused on the array of
individual options as a context. The collection of options
among which a decision maker must choose comprises a unique
context; if one option is replaced with another, the context
of the decision changes. Such changes in context can lead to
reversals of preference and other so-called “irrational” violations
of normative assumptions when the economic risk of the
options differs (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Bhatia, 2013).
Approaches to examining this type of context, such as decision
field theory (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Johnson and
Busemeyer, 2005), the stochastic difference model (González-
Vallejo, 2002), and the associative accumulation model (Bhatia,
2013) all model the decision maker’s ability to discriminate
options from one another based on differences in their economic
risk (e.g., it is difficult to choose among options that have similar
subjective utility). These models are context-sensitive because the
discriminability among options is dependent on factors such as
the individual options present (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993;
González-Vallejo, 2002) or the decision maker’s learning history
with the options (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Weber et al.,
2004).
The ISE Framework complements work in the economic
framework on contextual influences by modeling how perceptual
similarity can also influence context and choice. For example,
Baumann and Desteno (2010) demonstrated that participants’
estimates of base rates for encountering targets and foils
in a threat detection task were influenced by an internal
contextual variable, the participant’s emotional state. Across five
experiments, participants induced to feel anger were biased
toward identifying neutral objects as guns, whereas participants
in a more neutral emotional state were less biased. Bias was
associated with the extent to which anger influenced perceivers’
base rate estimates and could be eliminated by providing
participants with accurate information about the number of gun
trials in the task. The proposed base rate (B) weighting function
of Equation (7) could be used to model the psychological effects
of emotional state on objective base rate values.
Past experience is another important contextual influence
on decision making that could be modeled within the ISE
Framework (and see also Stewart et al., 2006, for the role of
long-term memory in decisions). For example, in an experiment
where radiologists performed a lung-nodule detection task, an
astounding 83% missed a picture of a gorilla that was inserted
into one of the images that was 48 times the size of the
average lung-nodule (Drew et al., 2013). This phenomenon,
known as inattentional blindness (cf. Simons and Chabris,
1999), is driven in part by individuals relying on expectations
about what is likely in a given context based on their previous
experiences in similar contexts. Thus, the ISE Framework could
help formalize how past experience contributes to inattentional
blindness by modeling past experience as weighting function B in
Equation (7).
Finally, research has also demonstrated that external contexts
can influence decision-making behavior. For example, the mere
presence of a weapon (e.g., a gun or a knife) has been shown to
make people behave more aggressively (Berkowitz and Lepage,
1967; Berkowitz, 1990, 1993). The ISE Framework can be used to
examine whether the presence of a weapon influences perceptual
parameters related to the decision to engage in aggressive
behavior (e.g., by making other people look more aggressive
or more threatening, or by increasing the estimated base rate
of encountering aggressive people) or influences the subjective
valuation of outcomes (e.g., by making people think behaving
aggressively has a low cost or will help them avoid alternative
high-cost outcomes).
Modeling Dysfunctional Decision Making in
Psychopathology
Another potential scientific impact of the ISE Framework is that
it can provide a model-driven approach for characterizing and
understanding dysfunctional decision making such as occurs in
those with psychopathology (e.g., Redish, 2004). For example,
Generalized Social Anxiety Disorder (GSAD) is characterized by
exaggerated concerns about negative evaluation and rejection
in social situations. People with GSAD exhibit what has been
termed a “zero-miss” threat perception strategy (Quigley and
Barrett, 1999) which is a pronounced tendency to respond
to or recall non-threatening stimuli as threatening as a result
of learning within an earlier threatening environment, and
measured as a liberal bias relative to control participants.
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These perceptual tendencies have been described within the
signals framework, but the work has largely been limited to
quantifying differences in sensitivity and bias among perceivers
(e.g., Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2008). Many of the emotional
and/or behavioral symptoms associated with GSAD might be
understood as long-term failures to accurately estimate one
or more of the parameters that describe the decision-making
environment (base rate, payoffs, and perceptual similarity).
In this view, it is the subjective “misestimation” of one or
more parameters that results in misperceiving social stimuli
as threatening, measured in the laboratory as abnormal bias
and/or sensitivity (Lynn and Barrett, 2014). The ISE Framework
provides a way to isolate which individually-relevant subjective
weightings of decision parameter(s) are being misestimated
via systematic within-subject manipulation of perceptual and
decision parameters.
Conclusions
A large class of ecologically valid, and quite common decisions
has gone largely unstudied. These decisions occur in the
context of economic risk, or variability in the value expected to
accrue from the decision, and signal-borne risk, or ambiguity
in the cues used to distinguish one option from another.
Using an integrated framework like the ISE Framework,
researchers can examine the influence of economic risk in
signal detection issues where it has been underemphasized,
for example in memory or perceptual learning, where costs
and benefits are seldom modeled. Using an integrated
framework, researchers could also examine the influence
of signal-borne risk in economic issues where perceptual
uncertainty has been underemphasized. For example, how
do decision makers discriminate among what appear to be
similar investment options, and how can emphasizing particular
investment details (the equivalent of perceptual features)
impact choices among investments with similar outcome
variability? Furthermore, contextual factors, including individual
psychological and biological differences and environmental
influences, affect how perceivers make decisions about
otherwise identical options. The integration of these decision
features within a single framework can enhance our ability
to understand a wide variety of decisions, in particular those
complexly determined, real-world decisions that we make every
day.
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